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ABSTRACT
ORGANIZATIONAL AND FOLICY RESPONSES 
OF FLINT AREA HOSPITALS TO THE 
MEDICARE PROSPECTIVE PAYMENT SYSTEM
by
John David McKellar, Jr.
In 1983, Congress approved a Medicare prospective 
payment plan for most inpatient hospital services which is 
widely regarded as the most significant change in the govern­
ment health insurance program since its beginning. The radi­
cally altered reimbursement incentives inherent in DRG-based 
prospective payment produce different contingencies and con­
straints that, in turn, require dramatically different organ­
izational and policy responses by hospitals. This paper de­
scribes a study designed to determine the extent to which 
local. Flint area hospitals are choosing the predicted, ad­
vised responses, what institutional variables are operating 
to influence those choices, and whether there is evidence that 
government policy intent will be achieved.
Interviews conducted with senior administrators at 
five sample hospitals confirmed that medical and financial in­
formation systems are being enhanced and integrated, outpatient 
services are expanding, hospitals are becoming more diversified 
in the types of services they provide, and vertically inte­
grated healthcare provider systems are developing in response 
to the prospective pricing plan. Contrary to expectation, and
legislative intent, little evidence was found of service (DBG) 
specialization by hospitals or greater physician administra­
tive involvement. Nor are hospitals restructuring internally 
to a product-line, matrix management approach in response to 
the Medicare reimbursement policy change.
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On March 2^, 1983, Congress approved a Medicare pro­
spective payment plan for most inpatient hospital services as 
part of the Social Security Amendments of 1983. This system
is widely regarded as the most significant change in the gov-
-1ernment health insurance program since its beginning. It 
represents a profound change in hospital reimbursement away 
from a system with inflationary incentives to a system with 
incentives for cost control and efficiency.
Under Medicare's old retrospective reimbursement sys­
tem, hospitals were paid, on a periodic, per diem basis for 
the process of inpatient care, based on each institution's 
reasonable costs of providing services. The size of the pay­
ment was a function of each individual hospital's total oper­
ating c o s t s . 2 With prospective payment, hospitals are paid 
a fixed rate for a specific product. Upon discharge, Medicare 
patients are assigned to one of ^67 newly defined "diagnosis 
related groups," or DRGs, based on the nature of their ill­
ness. Each DRG carries a specific rate of reimbursement. If 
treatment costs exceed established payment rates, the hospital 
loses money. If the rates exceed costs, the hospital profits.3
Medicare payment for inpatient services on the basis
1
2
of prospective prices is effective with each hospital's fis­
cal year beginning on or after October 1, 1 9 8 3 . The system 
will be phased in over a three year period, during which the 
payment for each Medicare discharge will be computed by blend­
ing a hospital-specific cost-per-case amount, the regional 
urban or rural price for the DRG to which the patient is as­
signed (adjusted for variations in wage levels), and the na­
tional urban or rural price for the DRG (also adjusted for 
wage level variations). When the system is completely imple­
mented, beginning in October, 1986, hospitals will receive a 
payment per Medicare patient that reflects an urban or rural 
national average price for each DRG, adjusted for differences
in area wages, and that is independent of costs incurred in
4any individual hospital.
Medicare currently accounts for thirty-six percent of 
operating revenue at the average American hospital.^ Among 
Flint area hospitals studied, the mean is forty percent (me­
dian, forty-three percent). Thus, the leap from service-based 
retrospective cost reimbursement to product-specified prospec­
tive rates necessitates that hospitals significantly change 
the way they do things. Further motivation to change lies in 
the fact that prospective pricing is expected to eventually 
be embraced by all third-party payers.^ In Michigan, a DRG 
prospective reimbursement methodology for Medicaid inpatient 
hospital services is scheduled for implementation in January, 
1 9 8 5 .^ The radically altered reimbursement incentives inher­
ent in prospective payment produce different contingencies 
and constraints that, in turn, require dramatically different
3
organizational responses by hospitals.
The Federal government's intended changes in hospital 
practices are clear. Certain hospital organizational and pol­
icy responses to the Medicare prospective payment system are 
likely to occur, dependent on certain institutional variables. 
These responses, and the possibility of those undesirable and 
"system-gaming" in nature, are thoroughly discussed in the 
literature. Accordingly, the purposes of this study are as 
follows:
1. To determine the extent to which local community hos­
pitals are choosing the predicted, advised responses.
2. To determine what institutional variables are opera­
ting to influence those choices.
3. To determine if there is evidence that government pol­
icy intent will be achieved.
What follows next in Chapter II is a literature re­
view. Chapter III states the research hypotheses. Chapter 
IV is a discussion of the methodology; the results are pre­
sented in Chapter V. Chapter VI is a discussion of these 
f indings.
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CHAPTER I I
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
This study involved preliminary research to answer 
three key questions. 1- What hospital organizational and 
policy responses are intended by the government through en­
actment of the Medicare prospective payment system? 2- What 
hospital responses are recommended by industry experts and 
predicted likely to occur? 3- What institutional variables 
may impact response decisions? Answers to these questions 
were arrived at via thorough review of recent healthcare and 
hospital management journals and the pertinent Federal Register 
documents, and follow below. Information contained in this 
chapter was used as a basis for developing the study hypoth­
eses, which are discussed in Chapter III.
A„ Hospital Responses Intended by 
Government Legislation
The following government intentions for hospitals have 
been articulated by DHHS officials^ and appear within the 
Medicare prospective payment system regulations published in 
the Federal Register:
1. Reduced inpatient utilization.
5
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2. Greater cost consciousness.
3. Behavior change to decrease hospital operating costs.
^ . Improved operating efficiency.
5. Services specialization, resulting in improved quality 
of care.
6. Increased competition among hospitals.
7. More active medical participation in the financial 
and operating routines of hospitals.
B. Hospital Organizational and Policy Responses 
Recommended and Likely to Occur
1. Enhancement and Integration of Hospital Medical and Finan­
cial Information Systems
There is general agreement in the industry that ef­
fective response to the Medicare prospective payment system
necessitates fundamental change in hospital information sys­
tems.-^ Averill et al. summarize that success under prospec­
tive payment systems will require that hospitals merge medi­
cal records, billing and financial data into a "single inte­
grated database."^ Dreachslin and Kobrinski assert that 
change in the configuration of hospital information systems 
should be the first order of business for management. "Only 
through the use of a merged clinical/financial data system 
allocated to the patient level can hospital management re­
spond to Medicare prospective payment...."^
Dreachslin and Kobrinski further point out that clin­
ical and financial systems need to be integrated and a costing 
methodology applied in order to permit the following essential
7
analyses:
Hospital cost by DRG in relationship to the Medicare 
prospective reimbursement rate.
Identification of the resource consumption profiles 
of each DRG.
Separate reporting of costs by ancillary and routine 
cost centers so that the components of DRG costs can 
be studied.
Medical audit reporting that allows for the analysis 
of physician-specific patterns of resource use by DRG 
and cost center.
Comparison of cost data by.case types from a meaning­
ful set of peer hospitals.
There is no doubt that improved cost accounting is an essen­
tial hospital response to prospective pricing; however, con­
siderable debate does exist as to the degree of accuracy nec­
essary (i.e., true costs versus some approximation of costs).^ 
More sophisticated, detailed medical/financial reports 
and more flexible report capabilities are also advised. The 
use of alternative case classification systems such as gener­
alized patient management paths, stage of severity and sever­
ity of illness index in conjunction with DRGs will be needed 
to capture case mix within DRG and communicate more meaning­
fully with physicians. Physician access to information about 
patient resource consumption concurrent with the patient's 
stay is a desirable enhancement. The cash register approach 
of providing physicians with running totals of the cost of 
medical practice compared to a budget based on expected re­
imbursement or cost norms will put utilization control desir-
Qably back in the hands of the physician.
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2. Service (DRG) Specialization
Prospective payment imposes a financial risk for hos­
pitals when treatment costs exceed payment rates. This has 
given hospitals a direct incentive for carefully assessing 
which types of patients they can treat most effectively and 
efficiently. There is consensus in the literature that cost- 
minimizing behavior may well involve increased specialization 
among hospitals, with each offering the limited mix of ser­
vices that can be most efficiently, and profitably, produced.
According to Averill et a l .:
The DRG "price list" furnishes a natural basis for 
both providers and payers to negotiate on price, and to 
specialize. Since both quality of care and cost (and 
therefore profitability) are likely to vary with the vol­
ume of a given DRG, don't be surprised to see. the more 
organized players, as well as the more sophisticated hos­
pitals, redistributing business along case-mix lines.9
Kovener and Palmer note that service specialization is two-
edged sword--increasing market share of some services and
discontinuing, or at least de-emphasizing, services that are 
1 ounprofitable. Pointer and Ross write that reducing or re­
stricting product line is a long-run proposition that gener­
ally entails closing hospital units, eliminating specific fa­
cilities and services, and changing the composition of the 
medical staff.11 According to Berman,
The strategy of second choice, which in time probably 
will become the dominant strategy, will be to reshape the 
product line--to give up some products, to take on others 
--to follow the track of strategic advantage.12
It is noted that hospital specialization was intended 
by the government through enactment of the new Medicare leg­
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islation. "...insofar as prospective payment encourages spe­
cialization in certain services, we believe treatment may be 
improved for beneficiaries and other patients."^3 Such a 
work division objective is consistent with classic public ad­
ministration theory.
3. Expansion of Outpatient Services
The basic incentive of a fixed price-per-discharge 
payment system is to reduce costs by reducing inpatient re­
source utilization. The basic way for hospitals to reduce 
utilization is to shorten the patient length of stays and re­
duce the use of ancillary services. Thus, a predicted, ad­
vised hospital response to the new Medicare plan is to in­
crease outpatient services, both in the area of pre-admission 
diagnostic testing and post-discharge therapeutic services.1  ̂
The Federal legislation further encourages this direction by 
excluding outpatient services from prospective payment, leav­
ing Medicare to continue to pay the costs of hospital outpa­
tient treatment.1^
k. Diversification/Vertical Integration
Industry sentiment regarding changing hospital pro­
ducts and services is summed up by Boerma:
A long-term impact of DRG reimbursement is continued 
development of integrated health care provider systems, 
including hospitals, nursing homes, and home care agencies. 
Because of an incentive to shorten lengths of stay in the 
acute care phase, vertical integration is enhanced by DRG 
re imbursement.17
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Lave concurs that the new Medicare financial arrangements:
...will further stimulate the restructuring of the 
hospital sector. This restructuring of the hospital sec­
tor consists of the corporate restructuring of given hos­
pitals, horizontal integration into hospital chains, and 
vertical integration as the corporate structure links am­
bulatory care centers, hospitals, nursing homes, etc.^°
It is noted that public administration thought acknowledges
the potential effectiveness and efficiency of "multi-organi-
zational arrangements."19
According to Dreachslin and Kobrinski,
Diversification may very well be necessary to maintain 
an adequate cash flow. Consideration of joining multi­
hospital systems, engaging in PPO or EPO contracting, using 
emergicenters and surgicenters, instituting pre-admission 
testing and contracting for outside services such as lab­
oratory may constitute possible hospital responses. In 
short, the hospital must now be run like a business with 
multiple levels of service.... 2°
According to Roe, changes in the Medicare reimbursement policy
clearly favor hospitals unbundling services and diagnostic
equipment into freestanding facilities.
5. Internal Management Restructuring
According to Nelson, to correspond with new accounting 
systems that capture costs and revenues by DRG, hospitals may 
well restructure internally and introduce product-line manage­
ment .
"Hospitals have got to examine how they manage.... I 
don't think they can manage as they have historically, by 
tending just to the 'paint shop,1 the 'fender shop,' and 
so on. Someone has to manage the Ford Escort through the 
entire process. And. product-line management, where one 
person is responsible for a program (obstetrics and gyn­
ecology , surgery, and so forth) may be the answer."22
Richards also foresees better-managed hospitals completely
11
restructuring internal management responsibilities.
Managers will be made responsible for groups of pro­
duct lines, and these will cut across a number of depart­
ments .... Under "matrix management" systems, managers will 
be accountable not only for particular medical services 
but also for the cost of component parts of the services, 
such as nursing, laboratory, surgery, food service, laun­
dry, supplies, and medication.23
Saltman and Young, too, suggest that:
One recent development within management theory that 
may better suit the hospital's organizational structure 
is a matrix theory, an approach developed for organiza­
tions that operate with two simultaneous yet distinct 
lines of decision-making responsibility. In most matrix 
organizations, one line of responsibility encompasses 
functional departmental managers while the other contains 
"project managers" who shepherd a specific project through 
the "production p r o c e s s . "2^
Noting that strategic marketing is a product of the 
Medicare prospective payment system, and that hospitals will 
need to be more responsive to opportunities, Gurtner and 
Ruffner write:
The old pyramidal hierarchy of decision-making with 
its built-in rigidity may be too slow to respond to a new 
opportunity. Instead, a product-specific or matrix form 
of organization may provide the necessary structural flex­
ibility to complement the marketing function. Organizing 
the hospital around product complexes such as geriatrics 
or cancer may encourage decentralized problem-solving, 
which may be the best response to the changing environ­
ment .
Specializing in a given product line leads to the 
development of expertise and managerial accountability. 
That is, an individual can better manage a homogeneous 
group of programs or products and can be held responsible 
for them. The product manager can be made responsible 
for "production" activities as well as promotion and dis­
tribution . 2 5
Such management re-orientation is supported by classic 
public administration theory regarding organizational and ad­
ministrative efficiency. Gulick introduced the principle of 
homogeneity to indicate limits on efficiency in hierarchical
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organization.2® Simon, following the work of Barnard, con­
ceptualized bounded rationality and zoned authority, reject­
ing the earlier Wilsonian presumption that perfection in hi­
erarchical organization is synonymous with efficiency.2?
6. Greater Fhysician Involvement in Hospital Management
Under Medicare retrospective, cost-based reimburse­
ment, hospitals and physicians essentially responded to the 
same incentives. But prospective payment switches the hos­
pital onto a separate track of radically divergent incentives 
to lower length of stays and reduce the use of ancillary ser­
vices. Physicians continue to be paid retrospectively on a 
fee-for-service basis and make the decisions regarding admis­
sion and services provided during an inpatient stay.2® Thus, 
physicians are a key to controlling resource utilization, and 
the hospital community's task in response to the new Medicare 
prospective payment system is clear, as succinctly stated by 
Wilson: "It must forge a new alliance between management and
the medical staff--one which breaks down the clinical/mana­
gerial dichotomy."29
The need for management-medical staff alliance is un­
derscored by specific reference to it in the legislation. It 
is the intent of government to "invite more active medical 
participation in the financial and operating routines of hos­
pitals. "30 Indeed, Wilson postulates that "Congress is de­
termined to change physician behavior and the hospital has 
been selected as the instrument of change."31
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The successful hospitals of the future, according to 
McMahon, will be "those that are going to have the best intra- 
institutional relationships--integrating the medical staff into 
operational budgeting, capital budgeting, all activities of the 
institution."32 Kahn notes that
...hospitals that don't already have medical directors, 
or some sort of management-medical staff liason are going 
to find it increasingly important to bring someone onboard 
who can provide clinical input about treatment protocol 
and, at the same time, be directly involved in budgeting 
decisions.33
Sandrick predicts that hospitals will increasingly seek phy­
sician participation in strategic planning.3^ Indeed, study 
of the organizational effects of DRG reimbursement on New 
Jersey hospitals found a growing number of medical directors, 
directors of quality assurance and medical education, and 
salaried chiefs of clinical services, indicating that medical 
staffs in DRG reimbursed hospitals have become more involved
in hospital operations.35
7. Other Predicted Hospital Responses
Other cost control strategies discussed in the lit­
erature besides reduced and more efficient provision of an­
cillary services include hospital staff reduction and/or 
growth rate adjustment, ̂ 6 increased emphasis on productivity, 
including measurement and staff training,3 7 more aggressive 
pursuit of price discounts from suppliers,38 improved energy 
conservation efforts,3 9 and investment in cost-saving tech­
nologies
1^
Besides expansion of outpatient services and integra­
tion with post-hospital care providers, lengths of stays may 
be reduced via increased emphasis on discharge planning,^ 
greater infection control efforts,^2 development of nutritional 
support teams,^3 and expansion of physical therapy departments.^ 
Shorter lengths of stays must then be compensated for by strat­
egies to increase hospital care volume (admissions) . ^ 5 One 
such strategy is the establishment of psychiatric and chemical 
dependency rehabilitation units, since these services are ex­
empted from the prospective reimbursement system.
Further predicted hospital responses to Medicare pro­
spective pricing include formation of DRG task forces and co­
ordinators,^^ improved internal (staff) and external (public)
h ocommunication and education efforts, ° and emphasis on ser­
vice quality and reliability.^9
C. Undesirable and "System Gaming1 
Responses Possible
Review of the literature brings to light certain pos­
sible hospital responses to Medicare prospective payment which 
purportedly would negatively impact government budget neutral­
ity intent as well as the overall quality of health care in 
the U.S. Such responses include:
1. Patient skimming/"product risk management" (refusal
to admit those Medicare patients who cannot be treated 
profitably; reduction in total proportion of Medicare 
admissions) . 5 0
2. Admission creep (multiple admissions of single patient 
having multiple ailments ) .51
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3. Diagnosis creep (classification of patients in most 
costly DRG categories).52
4. Cost shifting (to other payers).53
5. "Double-dipping" preadmission testing (taking advan­
tage of the fact that Medicare will currently pay for 
many diagnostic procedures twice).5^
6. Unnecessary admissions, with early discharge.55
7. Reluctance to invest in necessary technology, equip­
ment, and renovations.56
8. Reduction in medical education and research p r o g r a m s . 57
9. Reduction in community service programs, such as health 
education and outreach.58
D. Institutional Variables Which May Influence 
Hospital Response Decisions
It may reasonably be expected that historical percent­
age of Medicare admissions may influence the degree to which 
hospitals change and the aggressiveness with which they re­
spond to the prospective payment system. Review of the lit­
erature suggests other institutional variables which may im­
pact response decisions, including hospital size. geographic 
location, function. and corporate structure.
Small and rural hospitals will be affected more se-
*
riously by Medicare prospective pricing than urban or larger 
hospitals due to the purported inequitable application of the 
area wage indexes, and restricted cash flow and access to 
capital. They also tend to have volatile case mixes and cen­
suses often fifty to eighty percent Medicare. -59 Thus, the 
motivation to respond aggressively will be high, but change 
will be impeded by other factors inherent in the size and
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geographic location of these institutions. These include 
usually limited data processing and medical records resources 
and difficulty recruiting qualified personnel, as well as 
difficulty enlisting medical staff cooperation. Too, because 
of their unique service to their communities, rural hospitals 
are not easily in a position to specialize in their most ef­
ficiently provided DRGs and discontinue certain other types 
of care . 60
The impact of Medicare prospective payment on those 
institutions which function as teaching hospitals is at ques­
tion in the literature. On the one hand, they may be expected 
to respond aggressively to alter their tendency to see a larger 
proportion of more severely ill and indigent patients and the 
fact that the value of educating medical interns and residents 
has traditionally superceded that of using hospital services 
sparingly. However, due to the reimbursement adjustment paid 
to institutions which educate new physicians, many executives 
of teaching hospitals are not alarmed and predict that their 
facilities will fare well under Medicare's prospective pay­
ment system. Thus, initial responses may be accordingly tem- 
pered.ox
Much of the literature previously cited in this review 
advocates multi-organizational arrangements in response to the 
Medicare prospective payment system. Thus, those institutions 
which are already members of multi-hospital organizations are 
afforded greater resources and flexibility in response choices 
and may be expected to demonstrate a wider variety of responses 
than those hospitals not so corporately structured.
17
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CHAPTER I I I
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
The purpose of this chapter is to present the specific 
hypotheses tested in this study. The "local"--and, thus, 
narrow— focus of the project required recognition of its lim­
itations and refinement of the questions to be addressed.
The small hospital sample size precludes significant multi­
variate analysis of response decisions. The change to pro­
spective payment is so recent that not all hospital resoonses 
are concretely observable, indeed, even decided upon yet.
Also, data on "system-gaming" strategies, due to their impli­
cation, are difficult to elicit.
The hypotheses to be pursued in this study, therefore, 
were systematically culled from the universe of possible hos­
pital responses to the Medicare prospective payment plan, 
which were discussed in the preceding literature review, based 
on their manageable dimensions, concrete observability of re­
sponses, and relevance to government intent. Consideration 
was also given to their relationship to public administration 
concepts (e.g., specialization, hierarchical decision making, 




: In response to the Medicare prospective payment
system, hospital medical and financial information 
systems are being integrated.
^2 • -*-n response to the Medicare prospective payment
system, DRG specialization is occurring.
H3 : In response to the Medicare prospective payment
system, hospital outpatient services are expanding.
HAj, : In response to the Medicare prospective payment
system, divers ification/vertical integration is oc­
curring .
Htj: In response to the Medicare prospective payment
system, hospitals are restructuring internally to 
a product-line management approach.
Hg: In response to the Medicare prospective payment




The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data 
used in the study and to discuss the analysis of the data. 
Also, limitations of the study are explained.
A. Description of the Data
Data was collected during the month of December, 1984, 
via interviews with senior administrators at five hospitals 
within the Genesee-Lapeer-Shiawassee region. Those adminis­
trators who agreed to be interviewed included two chief fi­
nancial officers, a controller, a Director of Planning and 
Education, and a Director of Management Services. Hospitals 
were randomly selected from two size groups: those institu­
tions with more than 100 but less than 300 beds, and those 
with 300 or more beds. The interview method was chosen due 
to the recency of the policy impact under study. Many hos­
pital responses to Medicare prospective pricing are still in 
the planning stage, with such data only verbally available. 
Written planning documents may exist, but the likely inclu­
sion of sensitive strategic and competitive plans precludes 
their availability to the student.
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The interview format was informally structured to ad­
dress the hypotheses stated in the previous chapter. (See 
Interview Questionaire appended.) Actual reported hospital 
responses were compiled by type, frequency, and degree, and 
compared to those advised and predicted. Data on independent 
institutional variables, such as hospital size, geographic 
location (urban/rural), function (teaching/non-teaching), cor­
porate structure, and historical proportion of Medicare admis­
sions, were also collected and their implications considered 
in the analysis.
B. Limitations of the Study
Several limitations which should be recognized are 
explained in this section.
1. The small, five-hospital sample size precludes sig­
nificant multivariate analysis of response decisions.
2. The data reflect only those hospital responses acted
upon or considered at a relatively early stage in the
period of adjustment to the Medicare policy change.
3. The data will vary depending on the position and ex­
pertise of the hospital administrator willing to be 
interviewed.
k. Increasing marketplace competition in the healthcare
industry which is occurring concurrently with changing 
reimbursement policies is acknowledged to be a con­
founding factor in attributing some hospital responses 
soley to DRGs.
5. Some responses likely to draw public criticism, such
as discontinuation of de-emphasis of certain services,
may not be frankly discussed.
6. Hospital responses to prospective pricing deemed also 
to be of a strategic marketing nature are also un­
likely to be openly discussed.
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These limitations will be discussed in relationship 
to the findings later in this paper*
CHAPTER V
FINDINGS
This chapter contains a presentation and analysis of 
the findings derived from the interview data collected in 
December, 1884, from senior administrators at five Flint area 
hospitals. The findings are arranged in order of hypotheses 
Hi through H5 previously discussed. At the end of the chap­
ter, an overall summary of the findings is provided.
A. Information Systems Integration - Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that hospitals are integrating 
their medical and financial information systems in response 
to the Medicare prospective payment system. Table 1 presents 
the data related to this hypothesis. Analysis follows.
As expected, all Flint area hospitals studied have 
responded to Medicare prospective pricing by integrating med­
ical and financial information systems. One of the smaller 
institutions began the process three years ago in anticipa­
tion of the policy impact. The other hospitals have been in 
various stages of data merger for one to two years now. In 
all cases, the changes have been coordinated internally, with­

























































ITJ 0J *j  • -  a .
fO -S ̂  c
E  O' —  u  *—
-M lJ  




I -  o  ■»- 
4 J  U  V*
OJ 0J
£ 3
5  o j j  
- q  u  - o
< 4 4
2E O > <3CQ (-•—* 0> -C U
I •**«n tj i- S -C dl Q- OJ (✓1 w  L. fl uiOJ -C >>a  u  vi 3 U "O 0 3 O' =c •— V* (J dl U  V) 
OS OJ C  OJ O  J3 LU U
I
■- a. T5 <LP ra >> C t-
a ai aju O 6
2 . * O3 3*+* U
i/l
U  4  IQ Q- -C *-»U> 'Oz: u -o
CO 3  — • CL ̂ 3
VI (JJ 13 oj oj -e 
>- -C3 wi ot I (StO' S 0> *9u o  s- -CU  OS U— s woj *m  3
5  o  ‘t- a.ra Q£ O 
t -  O  i/> C4J Oj
3 01 O > U V
. cn jc
Ui O  3t'Cgra *n  n  »« O’
I .5l/lr- a> "Oil *J « o>- 3 > O
-  3  g a.
^ ui vi c -  h4U->- -O U Jf
!/» rv|
J c
+j |:ajjc oi a>J CL)
OJ <*-
T 3 I OJ wi 
OJ u  o  
*A t - C OZ O  4 0U >s CO —  -1- o
U  OJ f<-  *“> i! (/I —E  «  a? oj
S  OJ t -S3 « W  i j  c*-»A D 'O i/) D  L C 3  <T3 QC 51 — £ Q
•p> i/i 4) i/)■a —  o  pflj c c ^
i 3 c
qj "O P  *■—  -c -o aic * c o* «-l vi ai-r a  u 1| -  II 3- j5 ^ T5
r- O
OJ *-»£  c3
O  3
VI U  VI■a u  ai I 4 C
V* O O yo •
,  4  C ?  L
tn cv- i/i
o o t= -c
l. as.
■<— —  t/» C v> J ->s •- Q, Q. Vl-C ET >s cao *J 3 - 41
OJ -  
oj ■o o  cU  —  -Q O  <C > 4 U
29
Computer software and hardware to meet the new infor­
mation needs have been acquired to varying degrees by the 
sample institutions. All hospitals purchased DRG Grouper 
programs. The smaller institutions have purchased both soft­
ware and upgraded hardware. The larger hospitals have inter­
nally adapted their existing equipment, with two adding ad­
ditional microcomputers.
All hospitals have added staff (from 2.5 to 7-5 FTEs) 
to respond to the additional data collection and reporting 
needs of the DRG system, particularly for the diagnosis coding 
and utilization review functions.
In three of the five hospitals studied, the medical 
records department reports administratively to the chief fi­
nancial officer. One hospital instituted this realignment 
as a direct response to DRGs.
Cost accounting in each of the sample hospitals has 
been modified only slightly, and remains based on a ratio of 
cost to charges. However, three institutions are currently 
involved in developing costing standards in order to eventu­
ally be able to report-out actual costs per medical procedure. 
Identification of "true" costs by DRG, physician, or some 
other unit of analysis can then be obtained by aggregating, 
segregating or editing parts of the data base. Two of the 
three larger hospitals expect to implement detailed cost ac­
counting within the next year. One of the smaller hospitals 
anticipates a two year implementation time frame. The other 
remains undecided regarding the value of pursuing cost ac­
counting changes at all, viewing true-cost systems as perhaps
30
unnecessary and a panic response to DRGs.
All hospitals studied are aware of resource consump­
tion profiles of attending physicians. However, they are 
choosing not to communicate this information yet, The em­
phasis at present is on enhanced utilization review to fa­
cilitate reduced lengths of stays. Four of the five hospi­
tals do anticipate procedures within the next year to advise 
doctors of resource consumption per DRG, concurrently with 
the patient's stay. Two hesitant institutions, one large and 
one small, emphasized their sensitivity to not promoting pub­
lic categorization of physicians as financial "winners" or 
"losers."
B. DRG Specialization - Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that specialization in those ser­
vices (DRGs) which hospitals can produce most cost-efficiently 
is occurring in response to the Medicare prospective payment 
system. , The findings of this study indicate, however, that 
despite awareness of inpatient services which are not "pro­
fitable" under the DRG system, none have been discontinued by 
any of the sample hospitals. Though general medical units 
have been closed in four of the five institutions, all deny 
any intentions to terminate particular existing services, 
citing "social responsibility," hospital mission, and role as 
community service provider as reasons. The administrator in­
terviewed at one of the larger institutions did predict that 
in five years area hospitals will specialize in services
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determined via mutual decision-making.
On the issue of service marketing, those interviewed 
declined to respond, in much depth. There was agreement that 
certain inpatient services would likely be emphasized, pend­
ing the findings of case-mix monitoring and current market 
studies. No services have been de-emphasized yet. but the 
possibility is not ruled-out as better data becomes avail­
able within the next six to twelve months.
Exemption of inpatient psychiatric and rehabilita­
tion units from the Medicare prospective payment system has 
incouraged pursuits in these areas by four of the five insti­
tutions. One hospital has expanded its inpatient psychiatric 
unit; two have acquired such units; and one is planning to do 
so. Also, one hospital began offering chemical dependency 
services in anticipation of the policy change, and. another is 
planning such a unit. Two hospitals have had chemical depen­
dency units for many years now.
C. Outpatient Services Expansion - Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 stated that hospitals are expanding 
their outpatient services in response to the Medicare pro­
spective payment system. Table 2 presents the data related 
to this hypothesis. Analysis follows.
As expected, all hospitals studied are expanding or 
planning to broaden outpatient services in response to the 
Medicare prospective payment system, albeit some more ag­
gressively than others. Particular areas of emphasis, in
32
order of decreasing activity, are outpatient laboratory test­
ing (three hospitals are in the process of expanding services 
two are planning expansion), surgery (one hospital is already 
expanding services; three are planning expansion), physical 
therapy (three of the five hospitals are currently expanding 
this service), and chemical dependency treatment (one of the 
larger hospitals is planning to expand this service; another 
is planning to add it). One larger institution noted that it 
has made few firm decisions yet because it has not been oper­
ating under the DRG system long enough. Focus at present is 
on making internal operations more efficient rather than add­
ing new services.
D. Diversification/Vertical Integration - Hypothesis 4
Hypothesis *4* stated that hospitals are becoming more 
diversified in the services they provide, and they are devel­
oping vertically integrated healthcare provider systems in 
response to the Medicare prospective payment system. Table 3 
presents the data related to this hypothesis. Analysis fol­
lows .
Four of the five hospitals studied are developing 
vertically linked healthcare provider systems. The remaining 
institution is prohibited from doing so due to the nature of 
its charter. Primary areas of activity, in order of decreas­
ing frequency, are home care, nursing homes, hospices, free­
standing surgery centers, and freestanding chemical dependency 
centers.
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The findings reveal that one sample hospital has a 
relationship with a home care sister subsidiary of its parent 
company. Another institution is planning to contract with an 
independent home health care provider. Two other hospitals 
are expanding their own existing home care services. The sta­
tus of integration with nursing homes is as follows: one hos­
pital owns a convalescent center and has recently filed a cer­
tificate of need for expansion; another hospital has filed a 
CON to build a nursing home; yet a third and fourth of the 
five hospitals studied are “exploring" nursing home integra­
tion. Hospice services are in various stages of consideration, 
CON application, and implementation in three of the five in­
stitutions. A CON has been filed by one hospital and another 
is considering application for construction of a freestanding 
surgery center. One institution is expanding its contractual 
arrangements with freestanding chemical dependency centers, 
and another is considering such integration.
Diversification into office space leasing (by three 
of the hospitals), durable medical equipment sales (two of 
five), and other for-profit service contract businesses, in­
cluding home oxygen, physician office/clinic management, and 
consultant services, is also occurring among Flint area hos­
pitals in response to DRGs. As mentioned above, one insti­
tution complains that it has been unable to vertically inte­
grate and diversify services due to the nature of its charter. 
Eventual corporate restructuring is planned in this case and 
by two other hospitals studied. Two institutions had already 
horizontally reorganized in anticipation of the impact of
36
reimbursement changes and increased competition in the health 
care industry.
Eo Management Restructuring - Hypothesis 5
Hypothesis 5 stated that hospitals are restructuring 
internally to a product-line management approach in response 
to the Medicare prospective payment system. Findings reveal, 
however, that only one of the sample hospitals is doing so. 
Medical Program Administrator positions have been created at 
this larger institution to take charge of production and pro­
motion of specific groups of hospital services (product lines). 
This matrix management system is expected to be operational 
within a few months. The other hospitals studied revealed no 
intended change in their typically pyramidal, department-as- 
center-of-responsibility organizational and decision-making 
structures.
F, Greater Physician Involvement in Management - Hypothesis 6
Hypothesis 6 stated that physicians are being involved 
more in hospital management in response to the Medicare pro­
spective payment system. Findings reveal that all but one of 
the sample hospitals have historically sat one to two physi­
cians on their boards of trustees. Each hospital also has 
had a chief medical officer for some time now. Contrary to 
expectation, no hospital studied has facilitated any change 
in physician administrative involvement in the financial and
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operating routines of the institution in response to Medicare 
prospective payment. One frustrated administrator expressed 
the need to do so. The other hospitals are comfortable at 
present with the results of their physician education efforts. 
One institution effected a change in its by-laws, cutting in 
half the time required for physicians with admitting privi­
leges to complete their patient medical records.
G. Summary of Findings
Hypothesis 1 stated that Flint area hospitals are in­
tegrating their medical and financial information systems in 
response to the Medicare prospective payment system. This 
was found to be the case in all five sample hospitals. Thus, 
the hypothesis is sustained.
Hypothesis 2 stated that specialization in those ser­
vices (DRGs) which hospitals can produce most cost-efficiently 
is occurring in response to the Medicare prospective payment 
system. This hypothesis was not sustained insofar as none of 
the sample institutions have emphasized or discontinued or 
de-emphasized any services. It is noted, however, that future 
marketing of certain inpatient services is likely, and future 
de-emphasis of services is not ruled-out.
Hypothesis 3 stated that hospitals are expanding their 
outpatient services in response to the Medicare prospective 
payment system. This was found to be the case in all sample 
hosnitals. Thus, the hypothesis is sustained.
Hypothesis 4 stated that hospitals are becoming more
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diversified in the services they provide, and they are devel­
oping vertically integrated healthcare provider systems in 
response to the Medicare prospective payment system. This 
hypothesis is sustained, as all but one of the sample insti­
tutions are involved in such activities. The remaining hos­
pital is attempting to corporately reorganize so as to be 
able to do the same.
Hypothesis 5 stated that hospitals are restructuring 
internally to a product-line management approach in response 
to the Medicare prospective payment system. This was found 
to be the case in only one of the sample institutions. There­
fore, the hypothesis was not sustained.
Hypothesis 6 stated that physicians are being involved 
more in hospital management in response to the Medicare pro­
spective payment system. This hypothesis was not sustained 
insofar as none of the hospitals studied have facilitated any 
change in physician administrative involvement in the finan­
cial and operating routines of the institutions.
CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS
A. Summary of the Research Problem 
and the Findings
In 1983, Congress approved a Medicare prospective 
payment plan for most inpatient hospital services which is 
widely regarded as the most significant change in the govern­
ment health insurance program since its beginning. The rad­
ically altered reimbursement incentives inherent in prospec­
tive payment produce different contingencies and constraints 
that, in turn, require d.ramatically different organizational 
and policy responses by hospitals. The purpose of this study 
was to determine the extent to which local community hospi­
tals are choosing the predicted, advised responses, what in­
stitutional variables are operating to influence those choices, 
and whether there is evidence that government policy intent 
will be achieved.
Analysis of interview data showed that organizational 
and policy responses, actual and planned, to Medicare pro­
spective pricing chosen by a majority of the Flint area hos­
pitals studied, consistent with the advise and predictions of 
industry experts, include: integration of medical and finan-
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cial information systems, addition of medical records/utili- 
zation review staff, development of micro-costing methodolo­
gies, development of procedures to advise doctors of resource 
consumption per DRG concurrently with the patient's stay, ex­
pansion into psychiatric and chemical dependency rehabilita­
tion units, expansion of outpatient services, in the areas of 
pre-admission diagnostic testing, surgery, and post-discharge 
therapeutic services, vertical integration into home care ser­
vices, nursing homes and hospices, and diversification into 
office space leasing and other for-profit service contract 
businesses. Increasing marketplace competition in the health 
care industry which is occurring concurrently with changing 
reimbursement policies is acknowledged to be a confounding 
factor in attributing some of the above responses sole.y to 
DRGs.
The results of this study are somewhat surprising in 
three areas: (1) While many in the healthcare field antici­
pated that the Medicare prospective payment system would lead 
hospitals to specialize in the services that each could most 
efficiently and profitably produce, thereby discontinuing un­
profitable services, there is little evidence to date that 
such product line reshaping is occurring, or being given se­
rious consideration, by any of the sample hospitals in the 
Flint area. (2) Despite considerable attention in the lit­
erature to product line, matrix management restructuring, only 
one hospital is choosing this response, in fact, changing its 
historical internal organizational arrangement at all in re­
sponse to DRGs. (3 ) Also contrary to expectation, there has
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been no movement of physicians into greater administrative 
involvement in financial and operating routines of the hos­
pitals studied.
The impacts of independent institutional variables 
on hospital response decisions were not easily discerned in 
this study. The following observations are reported only to 
suggest areas for further study, with a larger and more heter­
ogeneous sample. Hospital size appears a factor in the ease 
and degree of information systems integration, with the larger 
institutions able to adapt existing hardware and program in­
ternally. The smaller hsopitals studied needed to acquire 
both hardware and software packages. One small-hospital ad­
ministrator suggested that development of detailed cost ac­
counting methodologies may not be cost-effective for smaller 
institutions like his. Hospitals whose geographical location 
makes them sole community service providers may be less likely 
to specialize in services or discontinue "unprofitable" DRGs, 
according to data provided by those sample hospitals located 
outside the City of Flint. Horizontally integrated, private 
(versus public) corporate structure appears to facilitate 
ease of adaptability to the reimbursement change by allowing 
a greater variety of response choices, as manifested by the 
two sample hospitals so structured. The other institutions 
are actively planning or considering such reorganization.
Also, the historical proportion of Medicare admissions, ap­
pears to affect the aggressiveness and intensity with which 
hospitals are changing to respond to changes in reimbursement 
policy. It is noted that the two Flint area institutions with
42
the lowest percentage of operating revenue accounted for by 
Medicare seemed the most conservative in their response de­
cisions. Finally, little was discernible in this study re­
garding the implications of hospital urban versus rural d.es- 
ignations or teaching versus non-teaching functions.
B. Limitations of the Study
Some possible limitations of this study were discussed 
at the end of Chapter IV. In this section these limitations
are discussed in relationship to the findings.
1. One limitation is the small sample size. Though
the findings involving the five hospitals can be generalized
to the response decisions of the three similar remaining in­
stitutions in the Genesee-Lapeer-Shiawassee region, signifi­
cant multivariate analysis of responses is not possible.
Other than the difference in bed.-size categorization, the 
sample was rather homogeneous. Four of the five hospitals 
are designated "urban” institutions by the Health Care Financ­
ing Administration. All of the larger hospitals function as 
teaching institutions. Thus, the discussion of the impacts
of independent institutional variables on hospital response 
decisions in the previous section must be considered only as 
a source of hypotheses for future study, with a larger, more
heterogeneous sample.
2. Conclusions drawn from this study must be tempered
by the fact that the data reflect only those hospital responses
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acted, upon or considered during the first year of the three 
year phase-in period of the new Medicare reimbursement system. 
Thus, some anticipated institutional changes may yet occur as 
the DRG rates become increasingly less hospital-specific and 
move toward, national average figures. Indeed, administrators 
interviewed acknowledged the challenge faced over the next 
two years. Many response options remain under consideration, 
with decisions yet to be finalized.
3* This study was further limited by the expertise 
of the hospital administrators who consented or were delegated 
to be interviewed. In each case the GEO or CFO was initially 
approached. Greatest confidence may be placed, in the data 
provided by the financial officers (interviewed in three of 
the five cases). The Director of Management Services and the 
Director of Planning and Education seemed less able to respond 
specifically regarding changes at their respective institutions.
4. All effort was made in this study to identify those 
hospital organizational and policy changes which are sole.v 
attributable to the Medicare prospective payment system. How­
ever, the increasing marketplace competition in the health 
care industry which is occurring concurrently with changing 
reimbursement policies motivates similar responses. Thus, 
some reported hospital changes, particularly in the areas of 
service efficiency and diversification, and vertical integra­
tion, were acknowledged by interview respondents to be dually 
motivated by DRGs and increasing marketplace competition, and,
f or»e, confound the validity of the results.
5. The issue of hospital administrators' reluctance
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to discuss responses likely to draw public criticism, such as 
discontinuation or de-emphasis of certain services, appears 
not to be a limitation of this study. All interview respon­
dents readily reported that no services have been terminated 
as a result of Medicare prospective pricing, nor are there 
plans to do so. Indeed, "loss leaders" (unprofitable DRGs) 
were mentioned which will continue to be provided. However, 
attention is again drawn to the relatively early stage of ad­
justment to the reimbursement change. This limitation may 
become an issue in later studies.
6. A final limitation of this study is the likelyhood. 
that hospital responses to prospective pricing deemed also to 
be of a strategic marketing nature will not be openly dis­
cussed. This beared true in that the only interview question 
on which comment was declined had to do with inpatient ser­
vices marketing in response to DRGs. Thus, the validity of 
the conclusion regarding the absence of DRG specialization is 
somewhat impuned.
C. Discussion of the Findings: Generalizabilit.y
and Policy Implications
Though the generalizability of the findings of this 
study is impeded by the small, localized sample, the unifor­
mity of certain responses to the Medicare prospective payment 
system, consistent with the recommendations of industry ex­
perts, across all sample hospitals suggests similar responses 
may be predicted throughout the country. Such organizational
^5
and policy changes include: integration of medical and finan­
cial information systems, more sophisticated computerization, 
addition of medical records and utilization review staff, ex­
pansion of outpatient services, development of vertically in­
tegrated healthcare provider systems, and diversification into 
for-profit service contract businesses. Findings at f o u r  o f  
the five hospitals studied also support the generalizability 
of the development of procedures to advise physicians regard­
ing resource consumption concurrently with a patient's stay.
Hypotheses found not sustained in all sample cases 
include the absence of any service (DRG) specialization in 
response to Medicare prospective pricing, as well as no greater 
physician involvement in hospital management to date. Thus, 
these finding, too, may be generalized to other institutions 
throughout the country, assuming similar existing levels of 
physician ad.minis trative paritcipation. The fact that four 
of the five hospitals studied have also not opted for product 
line management restructuring may also be predictive.
The findings of this research, including those hypoth­
eses not sustained, are corroborated in other recent studies 
of the early impact of DRGs. Gasper et a l .. in their study 
of Michigan hospitals, describe information systems integra­
tion, automation, and sophistication, outpatient expansion, 
service diversification, and procedures to provide physicians 
with information regarding resource consumption.1 Diversifi­
cation and vertical integration is documented in a nation-wide 
study reported by Hospitals. as is the lack of evidence of 
hospitals' specialization in profitable product lines and
A 6
little movement among physicians into hospital management since 
the enactment of the Medicare prospective payment system.^
Though hospital responses to Medicare reimbursement 
changes are only beginning to unfold, these findings suggest 
important policy implications. One of the purposes of this 
study was to determine if there is evidence that government 
policy intent will be achieved. The following conclusions 
may be drawn from the interview data:
1. Reduced utilization of inpatient hospitalization 
services is occurring.
2. Hospitals are increasingly more cost conscious 
and manifesting behaviors geared toward improved operating 
efficiency and cost reduction.
3. Increased competition among hospitals is begin­
ning to emerge via marketing strategies.
There is not, however, evidence to date of hos­
pital (DRG) specialization.
5. Nor is there evidence of more active medical par­
ticipation in the financial and operating routines of hospi­
tals .
Recognizing, again, that specialization and greater 
physician involvement may occur in time, these findings still 
warrant government monitoring of hospital responses to deter­
mine if legislative policy adjustments are necessary.
D. Conclusion
In the broadest sense, this paper represents an effort
^7
to understand the Medicare Prospective Payment System and 
hospital responses to it. Specifically, the responses of 
five Flint area hospitals have been analyzed. Despite the 
limitations of the approach, the findings are useful insofar 
as they suggest early trends and influencing factors for fur­
ther observation. Their policy implication to date is that 
Congressional intent may not be wholly achieved.
U8
Footnotes to Chapter VI
1Kyle Gasper, Richard A. Hamilton, and Phillip Herren, 
"DRGs: The Early Impact," Michigan Hospitals. (August, 1984),
7-13.








"As a graduate student of Public Administration at 
the University of Michigan-Flint, I am conducting research 
regarding responses of local hospitals to the Medicare Pro­
spective Payment System. Data are being collected via in­
terviews with hospital administrators. lour hospital will 
not be identified in the report. Your willingness to par­





Medicare accounts for approximately _____ % of operating revenue.
Medicaid accounts for approximately _____ % of operating revenue.
Urban or rural designation?
Number of FTE interns and residents:___________
Fiscal year begins_____________________ _
51
1. How have your hospital medical and financial information 
systems changed as a result of the DRG payment system?
2. To what extent have computers and/or software been pur­
chased by your hospital as a result of DRGs?
Have data processing/medical records staff been added to 
handle extra work related to DRGs? How many?
Has medical records department been administratively re­
aligned under finance department?
Has the hospital's cost accounting changed in reaction to 
Medicare prospective pricing?
53 
6. What type of cost accounting system is presently used in 
the hospital? 
aD "Bottom-up" system--associates true cost of every 
input to a final product? 
b. "Top-down" system--approximates costs based on ratio 
of charges to costs? 
7. Has the hospital engaged a consultant for an information 
systems master plan to deal with DRGs? 
8. What future information system changes are planned? 
For when? 
5^
9. Are you providing physicians with information about 
patient resource consumption concurrently with the 
patient's stay?
10. Are you involving physicians in hospital financial and
operational management as a response to prospective pay­
ment? How? In the past? Future involvement planned?




b. As members on hospital-wide 
committees (e.g., strategic 
planning, budgeting)?
c. As salaried department heads?
d. In medical staff liason 
positions?
Has the hospital added or expanded or planned any types 



























Do you anticipate closing any inpatient units or discon­
tinuing any services in response to the DRG system?
Which ones? Over what period of time?
Will any inpatient services be especially marketed?
14. Will any inpatient services be especially de-emphasized?
57
15. How do you decide about service marketing or de-emphasis?
16. Are certain hospital services purposely not being cut,
even though they are not "profitable” under the DRG sys­
tem? What kinds?
17„ Have DRGs prompted change in the hospital's internal man­
agement structure (i.e., toward product-line management, 
where one person is responsible for an entire program-- 
geriatrics, cancer, etc.— cutting across departments)?
If so, are product managers responsible for service pro­
motion as well as production?
In concluding this interview, your general impressions 
regarding the impact of prospective payment on your in­
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